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Trade and investment flows, as well as political ties between Latin American countries and China, have
intensified rapidly in the past decade. Since the early 1990s, Latin American politicians, business
executives and the media have started to pay exponential attention to China and its fast-growing
impact on the world’s economy and on Latin America itself. Chinese presence and influence in Latin
America has expanded quickly during the past decade, and the region’s leaders are seeking to better
understand the challenges and opportunities presented by China as it increasingly consolidates its
position as a global power.
For most of Latin America, with the main exceptions of Mexico and Central America, China has been
an engine for export growth, allowing exporters to diversify away from traditional markets in the north.
Beyond the fact that the region’s exports to China are concentrated on commodity products, the issue
remains that China’s economic and political rise should be a wake-up call for more reforms in the
region. As various studies and seminars carried out individually by the OECD Development Centre and
the World Economic Forum show, China no longer relies only on low-cost labour to generate economic
growth, but has become increasingly more competitive in higher value-added industries. Therefore,
Latin American governments and companies need to adopt winning strategies to succeed in an
increasingly competitive landscape, embracing the necessary reforms. 
This collaborative paper examines the myths and realities concerning China’s impact on the region and
also reviews various business strategies that Latin American companies are adopting to respond to
China’s growth. The work distils an agenda for action on how companies and governments can
maximize the opportunities offered by this new international context. We hope that this analysis will help
to better explain the main implications that this shifting power equation will have on Latin American
economies and their companies.
Javier Santiso Emilio Lozoya Austin
Director and Chief Development Economist Head of Latin America
OECD Development Centre Global Leadership Fellow
Foreword
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As China becomes a global economic power, Latin
American companies will need to adopt winning
strategies to succeed in an increasingly competitive
landscape. This paper explains the main implications
that the shifting power equation will have on Latin
America’s economies, analysing the myths and
realities concerning China’s impact on the region. It
also assesses some innovative business strategies
Latin American companies are adopting to respond
to China’s rise, distilling an agenda for action on how
companies and governments together can maximize
the opportunities offered by the new international
context.
The Shifting Power
Equation
• China will become a power of the size and
influence of the US in the next few decades
• The sophistication of China’s economy is
advancing at an even faster pace than its
economic growth
China’s increasing role as a pillar of the global
economy is no longer disputed. Averaging an annual
growth rate of 9.5% during the last three decades
and having become the world’s leading exporter in
2007, China’s ascent is crucial to understanding
market trends and shifts in the global financial and
commercial spheres. The only large question that
remains surrounding China’s rise is when its GDP
will surpass that of the United States; OECD
Development Centre studies assert that 2015 is the
most likely date, while Goldman Sachs estimates
2040 as the most accurate time frame. 
The world is witnessing one of the most important
and fastest ascents in recent history. But as shown
in Figure 1, China’s rise is far from being a transient
episode. Research carried out by the OECD
Development Centre1 on China’s economic history
over the last millennium shows that China’s weight in
the world economy is not a new phenomenon. The
world’s largest economy until 1890, China even
accounted for roughly one-third of global GDP in the
mid-19th Century. Therefore, the last hundred years
have been an exception rather than the rule
regarding China’s traditional position as the
champion of the world economy. The country’s
gradual liberalization and the opening of its economy
since the late 1970s have brought it back to the
centre of the global stage, a phenomenon shared
with other dynamic Asian economies. For instance,
although China and India still represent only 16% of
total global output, they currently account for one-
third of total output growth.
It is not only size but sophistication that matters.
China recently became the third country in the world
to put a man in orbit, and its integration into global
markets has been no less impressive. It has been
characterized by fast technological upgrading, as
the country’s export structure has been driven by a
large share of industries focused on medium and
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1 Maddison, A. (2008), Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run - Second Edition, Revised and Updated: 960-2030 AD, OECD Development Centre, Paris.
Figure 1.  Comparative Levels of GDP, China, 
United States and Latin America
Source: OECD Development Centre, 2008. Based on A. Maddison, Chinese
Economic Performance in the Long Run. Second Edition. Forecast for Latin America
based on Maddison series and Goldman Sachs study on BRICS (WP 134), 2006.
high technology manufactures. Figure 2 shows the
importance of manufactures, machinery and
equipments as a percentage of exports: the share
of high technology exports grew by almost 20% in
just ten years (between 1995 and 2005), while the
percentage of low technology exports halved. This
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largest consumer of copper, cement and soybeans,
among others, with a considerable impact on the
volatility of price and demand.
China has, therefore, resumed its journey towards
the prominence it had lost over the past century.
The speed and scale of its ascent make it difficult to
assess the exact impact on other countries and
economic players. The purpose of this document is
to provide an up-to-date view of how China’s
emergence is affecting Latin America. It looks at
some recent macroeconomic indicators while
reviewing the particular way in which specific Latin
American companies have reacted to remain
competitive in the face of increasing Chinese
competition. 
Myths and Realities
concerning China’s Impact
on Latin America
• Misconceptions about the sources of China’s
growth lead to incorrect conclusions about its
impact on other emerging economies, like Latin
America
China’s economic growth and its increased share of
world export markets have mostly been met with
apprehension in Latin America. There is indeed a
competitive threat arising from increasingly global
and sophisticated Chinese competitors, but there
are also a number of misconceptions around the real
is in combination with a considerable increase in
imports of medium and high technology goods,
which denotes a much higher level of intra-industry
trade. 
There is no doubt that China will play a major role in
most facets of the world economy. As shown in
Figure 3, the exact nature of this impact is difficult to
forecast in areas such as the environment, with
China’s carbon dioxide emissions rising rapidly as a
result of economic growth. The chart shows how
China will become the world’s biggest CO2 emitter in
the next couple of years, although by other
accounts2 it already surpassed US emissions in
2006. World commodity markets have also been
affected by the Chinese boom during the past
decade: the country has quickly become the world’s
Figure 3. Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Region 
(1990-2030)
2 Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, June 19, 2007 released Assessment.
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Figure 2. The Chinese Economy and Technological Upgrading
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effects of China’s ascent on Latin America’s
economies. Insufficient attention is being paid to the
opportunities brought about by this new context. 
A closer look at three common perceptions of
China’s impact on emerging markets can help clarify
whether or not Latin American countries can benefit
from the ongoing shifting power equation in the
world economy. The first myth relates to China’s low
labour costs and the implications for other emerging
regions. The second one is China’s supposed
negative impact on the allocation of foreign direct
investment, particularly to Latin America. Finally, a
third myth is the idea that China’s growth has mostly
benefited South America’s commodity exporting
countries and has been detrimental only to those
economies that rely to a greater extent on
manufacturing exports for growth. Whereas these
perceptions are partially based on observed
phenomena, a closer look at the data seems to
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Source: International Monetary Fund.
contest them, initiating a much more complex
debate on the future challenges Latin America faces
from China.
Myth I: The main source of 
China’s competitive advantage 
is cheap labour
Reality: Low labour costs in China are significant but
the wide availability of capital, coupled with very high
productivity growth levels, are equally important in
explaining China’s hard-to-beat competitiveness
China is widely perceived as a huge manufacturing
hub whose main competitive advantage lies in low
labour costs. Although there is some truth to this
statement, labour markets are changing at a very
rapid pace. Chinese wages continue to be lower
than in most Latin American countries but they are
rising fast at an annual rate of close to 8%. The
labour-cost gap with other emerging economies is
therefore diminishing. 
On the other hand, Chinese investment rates
continue to be very high, at around 40%, which
favours an abundance of capital for investment. A
high level of investment would normally indicate a
future slowdown in the return to capital. Surprisingly,
return to capital continues to be strong, and stable
at around 20% since 1992, thanks to important
productivity gains. 
Figure 5a shows that investment rates in China (as a
share of GDP) between 1980 and 2006 almost
doubled during this period. Whereas investment in
9
Source: Bai, Chong-En. C. Hsieh and Y. Qian. “The Return to Capital in China”. NBER Working Paper 12775. National Bureau of Economic Research. December 2006. 
Based on China Statistical Yearbook.
Another commonly held belief is that China’s receipt
of FDI flows negatively affects other emerging and
developing economies. According to this argument,
this negative effect is the result of a zero-sum game:
the FDI that flows to China does not go to other
emerging markets. Certainly there is some evidence
of this substitution effect on some East Asian
economies, but the evidence is less conclusive
regarding Latin America. Analysis of the period from
1995 to 2001 shows that China’s inward FDI partly
hampered flows to Mexico and Colombia, but not to
the leading economies of the region, such as
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela.4 Investments
attracted by China would not necessarily have gone
to Latin America in the absence of a booming
Chinese economy. Other Asian countries are more
affected by China’s competition as a recipient of
foreign investment.
One of the main reasons behind the different nature
of FDI inflows into China and Latin America is the
Chinese financial markets’ spectacular growth in
size and scope during recent years, which has
provided an important source of endogenous
funding for Chinese companies. The rapid pace of
financial asset creation indicates that FDI flowing
into China is mostly the result of technology
transfers rather than a need for financing, which
could well be met by national investors. Latin
America offers a sharp contrast, since it attracts
financial investors to a greater extent by higher
returns in a still relatively scarce environment of
long-term capital. Thus FDI has a different nature in
fixed assets has increased dramatically, the return to
capital (Figure 5b) has remained relatively stable, as
explained above. This phenomenon, combined with
high levels of consumer and corporate savings in
China,3 indicates that at least in the short to medium
term the abundance and availability of capital is
sustainable. Thus the argument that China became
a manufacturing hub only as a result of cheap labour
needs reconsideration: high productivity growth
explains its expansion to a large extent and the wide
availability of capital is at least as important. 
Therefore, the myth that China’s main competitive
advantage lies in low labour costs is misleading. A
long amount of time must still pass before the gap in
wages with other emerging regions is bridged, but
as a closer look at the macroeconomic data
suggests, the wide availability of capital and high
productivity levels might be better elements to
explain China’s hard-to-beat competitiveness. 
Myth II: China has a negative 
impact on FDI flows 
to other emerging markets 
Reality: Most Latin American economies do not
compete for the same type of FDI that China
receives and China’s investments in Latin America
are only the beginning of a trend that offers many
opportunities for the region
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Figure 6.  Inward and Outward FDI Flows in Latin America (1990-2006) USD Millions
3 Jahangir, A. and L. Cui (2007), “Explaining China’s Low Consumption: The Neglected Role of Household Income”. International Monetary Fund Working Paper 07/181.
Washington, DC. 
4 García-Herrero, A. and Santabárbera, D., “Does China Have an Impact on Foreign Direct Investment to Latin America? in Santiso, J. (ed.) (2007), The Visible Hand of China in
Latin America, OECD Development Centre, Paris.
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both regions: in China it is more oriented towards
technology transfers whereas in Latin America it is
motivated by higher returns. This explains to a great
degree the absence of a clear substitution effect.
In any case, another reality behind China’s
international role in terms of FDI flows is often
ignored. Its capital accumulation is gradually turning
the country into a net exporter of investment.
Notwithstanding its role as a magnet for direct
investments, China’s demographic structure,
pension reforms and high saving rates are likely to
turn investment in the opposite direction. China will
be one of the major exporters of capital in the next
decades, and many Latin American countries are
already benefiting from growing FDI flows from the
Asian giant.
The claim that China has a negative impact on FDI
flows to other emerging economies is, therefore,
relative: developing countries compete for limited
FDI from developed economies, but they are
increasingly benefiting from South-South
investments. Research does not seem to suggest
that most Latin American economies are particularly
affected by China’s competition for FDI. On the
contrary, growing Chinese investments in Latin
America are likely to offer opportunities for the
region, as is being witnessed.
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Figure 7.  Average Export Competition with China for Selected Countries (2000-2006)  Coefficients of Specialization
Note: CS coefficients calculated with exports of country i and exports of country j (China). A coefficient of 0 would mean countries export completely different products, a
coefficient of 1 would mean that the countries export the exact same product basket.
Source: OECD Latin American Economic Outlook 2008. OECD Development Centre, based on WITS Database, 2007.
Myth III: China’s rise benefits
commodity exporting countries and
adversely affects light-
manufacturing exporting nations
Reality: China’s rise offers opportunities and
challenges for both groups of countries in keeping
and sustaining a manufacturing sector
China has been seen as a problem for light-
manufacturing exporters while it benefits raw-
commodity producers. High commodity prices,
partly motivated by China’s and India’s growing
demand for oil, minerals and raw materials, certainly
benefit the trade balance of many Latin American
countries, although the export bonanza in
commodities is not risk free. An excessive focus on
commodities could be shifting resources away from
other sectors, particularly manufacturing. As pointed
out in the OECD’s Latin American Economic Outlook
2008, the Latin American economies should be
aware of the risks of Dutch Disease: excessive
specialization and export concentration on
commodities might drive exchange rates up,
inducing a long-term decline in non-commodity
exports.5 China’s current blessing could, therefore,
pose a longer-term problem for certain Latin
American countries if the current boom in
commodity prices is not adequately managed.
5 OECD Development Centre (2007), Latin American Economic Outlook 2008 (Chapter 4), OECD Development Centre, Paris.
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Looking more closely at trade structures and
competition between China and Latin America’s
economies, it appears that the Asian giant is not that
big a commercial threat for most countries in the
region. Except in some cases where there is a clear
overlap of exported goods, such as in Mexico and
certain Central American countries, the trade
structures of most Latin American countries show a
pattern of complementarity with China, rather than
one of fierce competition (Figure 7). 
However, to gain a better understanding of the real
implications of China’s trade-based economy on
Latin America, the examination should look instead
at these two regions’ export structure in local or
regional markets, where most basic, low and
medium technology manufactured goods are traded.
Figure 8 uses coefficients of specialization to
compare the trade structures of China and Brazil in
a third market, South America. The question is how
much Brazilian exports to South America compete
with Chinese exports to South America. In this case,
the two countries show a higher degree of
competition against each other in most markets,
particularly in Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador and
Venezuela. Coefficients of specialization for Brazil
and China in Figure 7 are a bit below 0.3 and, in
Figure 8, the same coefficient calculated only for the
exports to the four countries mentioned is close to
0.8. And the competition has been rising between
2000 and 2006!
Chinese trade competition with Latin American
countries, even those with strong commodity-based
economies, is therefore not clear-cut. Many
countries, particularly in South America, present
trade structures that suggest complementarity rather
than anything else, in particular due to China’s
growing demand for commodities. However, when
trade competition between such countries as Brazil
and China is measured at the regional market level,
rivalry accentuates. The distinction between a
beneficial effect for commodity exporting countries
and a negative one for economies with a strong
light-manufacturing sector is not as clear when
elements like the risk of Dutch Disease are taken
into consideration.   
Latin American Companies
Are Leading the Adaptation
to a New Competitive
Landscape
• Although government reform must improve the
conditions for economic development, individual
companies can act as a catalyst for change
within an industry and provide the basis for more
targeted reforms
• Successful business strategies to adapt to
Chinese competition in particularly exposed
industrial sectors involve bold and ambitious
moves along the value chain and geographical
expansion
The previous section concluded that China is an
increasingly sophisticated economy whose
competitive edge is solid and based not only on
cheap labour, but on high-productivity growth and
an abundance of capital. Chinese companies also
enjoy immediate access to a large, booming market
that will be the biggest in the world within two
decades. These advantages make them formidable
competitors. In order to withstand this competitive
threat, in particular for products that are subject to
international trade, Latin American companies must
make the most of their comparative advantages,
including the proximity to such key markets as the
US and the maximization of close cultural ties, and
the exploitation of strong existing networks that may
facilitate market access and penetration.
In order to get a greater (more micro-) perspective
on the impact of China’s rise, this section evaluates
the response of four illustrative Latin American
companies and their corporate-strategy decisions.
The purpose is not to make an exhaustive analysis
of the best business strategies to adopt to make the
best of China’s ascent, but rather to gain a better
understanding of the conditions and public policies
that lead to success. The underlying assumption is
that public policy can follow and strengthen the
successful business strategies and innovations of
companies and entrepreneurs. 
Many Latin American companies have successfully
ridden the boom and rise of China, particularly in the
basic and natural resources industries. Companies
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like CVRD, Aracruz, Gerdau and Codelco have even
gained a strong foothold in the Asian country.
Indeed, those companies have actually been among
the main drivers of growth in Latin America in the
past decade. Their rapid ascent into the ranks of
global multinationals deserves particular praise and
their investments in technology and quality have led
many to be global leaders in their industries. As they
consolidate their local supplier base, they also
create more and higher paid jobs. An interesting
example of this trend is the evolution of the
ecosystem of companies around the Petrobras
expansion.6 The region needs more of these leading
companies.
However, the current analysis focuses on
companies in sectors with no absolute comparative
advantage and where there is immediate or
potential competition from Chinese firms. The
selected corporate strategy decisions in this
analysis are evaluated along three dimensions: (1)
product (or market) portfolio; (2) value chain
presence; and (3) geographical presence. The
findings are based on research and interviews with
the leaders of several Latin American corporations
that form part of the World Economic Forum’s
network. The strategies of four companies that
provide a particularly good illustration are
summarized in Figure 9, in line with the three
dimensions mentioned above: 
• Bematech, based in Curitiba, Brazil, is a
manufacturer and solution provider of point-of-
sale hardware and software targeting the needs
of the small to mid-sized retail and hospitality
markets. Bematech has over 1,200 employees
in over 20 offices, manufacturing facilities and
warehouses located throughout the world. 
• Organización Corona is the leading Colombian
producer and seller of home improvement and
building products. It has long enjoyed a leading
position in Colombia in ceramic floors and
bathroom building products. The company has a
presence in several Latin American countries,
the US and Canada. Corona has 10,500
employees, 90% of whom are based in
Colombia. 
• Nemak, founded in Nuevo León, México, and
part of the larger Grupo ALFA, is the world’s
leading producer of aluminium cylinder heads,
engine blocks and other aluminium components
for automotive applications. Nemak has close to
15,000 employees in 13 different countries,
including China.
6 “América Latina frente al Crecimiento de India y China”, Presentation by Almir Barbassa, Chief Financial Officer of Petrobras, at the VIII Foro Latibex. Madrid, November 2007.
• Koramsa, in Guatemala, was judged by some to
be the biggest maquila in Latin America in 2005,
with more than 20,000 employees. Until 2006 it
provided an “integrated” assembly package as
contractor for 14 North American labels, mostly
for jeans and other denim products. 
13
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Figure 9.  Illustration of Changes in the Value Chain, Geographic and Market Presence of Selected Latin American Companies
Source: Interviews, Company Annual Reports, World Economic Forum and OECD Analysis
Strategy: Use China’s unique capacity to design and produce technology
products and focus on capturing more downstream value 
• Outsourced some R&D activities and unique component manufacturing 
to Asia 
• Took advantage of the superior speed and innovation ecosystem and
increased product portfolio offering in home and foreign markets 
• The faster product development speed gave it a competitive advantage 
over other suppliers. The company exploited its greater customization
capacity to win clients and expand first regionally and now globally
Strategy: Integrate China’s unbeatable low-cost base into its value chain
and focus on innovation and scale in regional markets
• Gained scale by expanding into the US by acquiring a local manufacture 
with strong brand and distribution network
• Installed a team of engineers and quality officers to source from the
cheapest producers in China
• Is now importing some finished products but mostly intermediate products
and parts that are assembled in Colombia and the US to accelerate new
product development and increase product portfolio. More and higher
technical jobs are needed
Strategy: Focus on a high value-added niche and achieve global
dominance
• Early on, decided to focus only on the segments of automotive supplies
where it could differentiate itself 
• Worked closely with its buyers and got involved in joint product development.
Achieved world quality and technical leadership
• In early 2000s, started a quick global expansion via M&As and added more
of the best in segment companies
• Present in China where its global scale and technology advantage make it
hard for smaller, lower quality producers to compete with it
Strategy: Change the product mix to segments with high volatility of
demand and high customization needs
• Reinvented itself after losing 70% of its workforce due to the entry of
Chinese textiles into the US market in 2006 (WTO)
• Now produces higher value-added garments in smaller batches with shorter
lead times. Has moved into providing distribution and inventory-management
services for its buyers
• Has higher paid, more technical jobs than before, with greater investment 
in technology
• Has stabilized its workforce and business but its long-term sustainability is in
question if it is unable to move downstream with its own brand and fashion
design (as is the case of successful companies in the region, including
Wrangler in Costa Rica)
14
suppliers and contractors. Its operations in China
have so far been a success: its sales and product
portfolio have grown, technological upgrades have
been made and the number and quality of jobs have
increased. With this new and stronger base, Corona
is rapidly expanding regionally to countries with
traditionally very strong local players, such as Brazil
and Mexico.
Three central strategies emerge from this brief
analysis of Latin American companies’ responses to
increasing Chinese competition: the need for
upstream value integration, a focus on a high value-
added global niche and specialization on product
segments with high volatility of demand and the
need for customization.
a. Upstream value chain integration to
capture greater downstream value
The case of Bematech illustrates the potential for
closer integration with China to benefit from lower
production costs in the product development
process while keeping the most valuable segments
of the value chain under tight control. At the same
time, Bematech has used its strong understanding
of regional cultural differences to outcompete larger
Japanese and American rivals. In Latin America it
operates from Argentina and uses the region as a
hub for innovation. When its installed base has
grown and has adapted to local requirements, its
position for further revenue streams for service and
other sources is strengthened. 
The ecosystem for components design and
manufacture in and around Taipei is impressive.
Moving a large portion of our R&D and
component design to Asia has accelerated our
market response rate and our capacity to deliver
more new and customized products to our
customers.
Marcel Martins Malczewski, 
CEO of Bematech
“
”
We used to import finished faucets and
metal taps. We now import only some key
components that we assemble in our Colombian
plant, and we can integrate them better with new
designs and with our brand identity.
Luis Alberto Botero,
CEO of Corona Sanitaryware
“
”
Organización Corona presents a similar example of
using China to grow regionally and incorporating
more jobs and added value. The company leads in
ceramic floors and bathroom building products in
Colombia. Its evolution and internationalization show
how a determination to compete globally has
allowed it to take advantage of the rise of China to
spur growth and strengthen its regional position.
Corona’s first step was to expand its value chain
presence in the United States, until then by far its
most important export market. In 2004, the
company acquired the operations and brand of
Mansfield, a US firm. It then considered establishing
a manufacturing plant in China in order to address
need in the US and gain a foothold in China. After
greater investigation it finally decided against
entering the Chinese market, but nevertheless
created an office in the country with a Colombian
supervisor and 12 engineers overseeing local
b. A focus on a high value-added niche to
achieve global scale
It is difficult to find in the region a better example of
a successful global niche strategy than that of
Nemak. The company is the world leader in its
sector of activity – aluminium cylinder heads, engine
blocks and other aluminium components for
automobiles – and has rapidly expanded across the
globe to achieve economies of scale and solidify its
technological edge. Its production facilities in China
do not represent a large portion of the company’s
operations, but the presence is important to keep
the development of other potential, more
sophisticated players at bay. Nemak’s choice of
segment for specialization was made as a result of
the threat of commoditization and competitiveness
in several other segments of the automotive
industry. It was selected based on its need for
greater technical prowess and specialization. This
niche strategy quickly paid off: the company
opened its first factory outside Mexico in 2000 and
has experienced quick expansion since. 
Another Latin American company that is widely
known for succeeding as a global niche player is
Embraco, the Brazilian compressor producer. By
being a pioneer in China and internationalizing
quickly, Embraco achieved early access to a
booming Chinese market and a greater volume of
operations that accelerated its expansion in other
parts of the globe and secured its position as the
world’s leading producer of compressors. As with
Nemak, a key factor in Embraco’s success has
been the company’s R&D leadership in its specific
sector of activity and the ability to integrate globally
in the segment via a joint venture and close
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collaboration with final product manufacturers.
Companies like Mexico’s Grupo Gruma (Maseca
Tortillas) have pursued a similar strategy and
successfully entered the Chinese market. 
c. A focus on product segments with 
high volatility of demand 
and high customization needs
Finally, the strategy of focusing on segments with
high volatility of demand and greater need for
customization, to exploit geographical advantage, is
illustrated by the case of Koramsa. A large maquila
in the textile sector, Koramsa was hard hit by
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization
(WTO), which allowed the entry of Chinese denim
products into the US – Koramsa’s main market by
far – as of January 2006. Less than a year later, the
company was bleeding cash and had drastically
reduced its workforce from 20,000 to less than
7,000. Since Chinese producers had access to
much cheaper fabrics7 and a lower-cost labour
force, Koramsa’s leadership swiftly decided to move
into the manufacture of more elaborate products,
with shorter cycles and greater customization. As
shown in Figure 9, Koramsa expanded its number of
stock keeping units and began providing distribution
and logistics services at the request of buyers. In
order to manage the business’s added complexity,
the company invested heavily in IT and raised the
level of much of its workforce (for instance, line
supervisors who in 2005 had only achieved a high
7 CAFTA provisions do not allow Central American manufacturers to buy their fabrics outside Central America or the United States. 
8 Taken from “Beyond Cheap Labour: Lessons from Developing Economies”. The McKinsey Quarterly 2005 Number 1.
It is critical for us to consolidate our move
downstream in the value chain, where we can
create more value with design and with our own
brands. We feel confident that we can rebuild
profitability and trust our capacity to create more
high-value jobs. But it is important to understand
that a niche business is a niche: the volumes that
provided for 20,000 jobs in the past are gone for
good.
Peter Klose, 
CEO of Koramsa
“
”
school education had all been replaced by industrial
engineers by 2007). Today the company has
managed to stabilize its workforce at 7,000
employees, with a greater number of higher-paid
workers and a more solid competitive position. 
In contrast to the previously cited cases, Koramsa’s
story only shows moderate success and the
company still faces a number of challenges. Change
to a “higher valued-added” segment has thus far
had its shortcomings. The volatility of demand is
reflected most in the volatility of demand for labour,
for instance. Moreover, the added complexity, while
producing higher-paid and more sophisticated jobs,
must still translate into greater profitability. So far,
inventory keeping services have only increased the
level of working capital.
Koramsa’s partial success does not mean that
niche strategies cannot be very successful. Jabil
Circuits, a Mexican contract manufacturer of
electronics products for the likes of Cisco and
Nokia,8 is well known for having been able to move
up the value chain in other sectors severely hit by
Chinese competition. As orders were lost to Asian
competitors, Jabil saw its workforce of 3,500 shrink
by half from 2001 to 2002. Instead of attempting to
win back lost orders, the company learned to make
more complex and customized products (computer
routers and handheld credit card machines, for
example) that were traditionally made in the United
States. Managers at one of the company's Mexican
plants very deliberately studied the US market to
ascertain the necessary performance levels and the
areas in which lower-cost labour could create an
advantage. As a result, the factory retooled its
inventory system and trained workers to undertake
more than one task at a time, so the number of
items it was able to produce rose to more than
6,000, from 600. Orders flooded in, and
employment by 2005 was 10% higher than it was at
its peak in 2001. As of 2007, revenues continue to
grow at over 30% a year, reaching almost 2 billion
dollars in the period. Other companies in Mexico, in
particular in the Guadalajara IT cluster, have also
been working hard to make similar transitions.
All the cases mentioned above and other interviews
with regional leaders underline critical elements that
make a successful adaptation to Chinese
competition possible. An adequate coordination of
winning business strategies and fitting policy
measures could allow an even greater number of
companies to succeed and adapt to the new
Chinese century. As shown in Figure 9, all winning
business strategies involve companies moving along
the value chain, carrying out geographical
expansion and – in many ways – handling greater
complexity and sophistication. These needs
highlight the importance of policies that make
possible these transformations by: 
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Beyond policy recommendations, a few
additional insights and unique challenges can be
summarized from the different discussions held
with leading business actors:
• Business leaders must think regionally in
order to exploit regional market networks
and cultural advantages
• Companies that have been successful have
acted with foresight by acknowledging that
the Chinese phenomenon requires an overall
change in strategy, even in circumstances
when the competition appears to be indirect
or only apparent in the long term
• It is important to think proactively, while the
business is still solid enough to finance the
acquisitions or expansion that can help it
face future challenges from a stronger
position
• Investment in IT and technology upgrades
are present in all cases of success and
adaptation
• In the case of the textile industry attempting
to move up the value chain, but also
applicable to other markets that first need to
build a local market in order to move along
the value chain, a local market must exist
and be protected from unfair competition
(mostly from smuggled products). A
reference on this point is an example in
Colombia, where companies like Arturo Calle
are very successfully developing a strong
design and fashion business that they are
now actively taking global
Defining an Agenda 
for Action
• Investment in infrastructure would maximize
Latin America’s proximity to the US and boost
intraregional integration
• Current windfall export revenues should also be
channelled towards innovation and economic
diversification in order to foster Latin American
competitiveness and mitigate some of the risks
derived from China’s economic rise
Understanding the challenges in order to expand
the winning business strategies that offer the
possibility of long-term success in the relationship
with China allows for clearer, concise messages to
policy-makers. Taking as a basis the summary
outlined at the end of the previous section and
combining it with macroeconomic trends and
updated figures, the following agenda outlines the
key areas where action by Latin American leaders
from the public and private sectors can help
maximize the opportunities offered by China’s
economic rise. 
The need for infrastructure: maximizing
geographical advantage
Latin America’s proximity to its most important
market, the United States, is a big and still
unexploited advantage for the region. Good
infrastructure that takes advantage of Latin
America’s geographic proximity to the United States
can contribute to strengthening the region’s trade
position. Paradoxically, transport costs actually pose
higher barriers to Latin America’s products entering
the US market than tariffs (Clark 2004, in OECD
Latin American Economic Outlook, 2008).
Competitiveness indicators underscore the
extensive heterogeneity in performance across Latin
American countries (see Figure 10). With China
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Figure 10.  Infrastructure Assessment for Selected
Countries (Ranking from 1 to 7)
• Developing local and regional
infrastructure with a focus on effective
trade facilitation
• Increasing innovation and workforce
qualification through incentives for R&D
and better synchronization with
universities 
• Introducing greater flexibility in labour
laws to match the increased adaptability
to the demand 
• Raising quality standards and norms for
local and regional production 
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Central American countries that are more highly
exposed to competition from China and India, it is
particularly important to build trade oriented
infrastructure capitalizing on the competitive
advantage provided by their proximity to the world’s
largest economy.
The need for integration: maximizing 
exchange flows
Interregional infrastructure would certainly help boost
another key area in Latin America’s agenda for
action: a deepening of economic integration. Latin
America is on a positive track to economic
integration, although the multiplication of bilateral
and regional agreements brings confusion rather
than clarity and leaves much room for improvement. 
The percentage of intraregional imports and exports
as a share of total trade offers a moderate
assessment of Latin America’s level of regional
economic integration. In 2005 Latin American
countries imported roughly 20% of their goods and
services from other Latin American economies, and
exported around 16%. While growth in intraregional
trade was spectacular in the early 1990s, it came to
a halt in the following years and its share of total
trade actually fell between 1998 and 2002, as
various financial crises hit the region. Since 2002,
and coinciding with a period of sustained annual
growth above 4.5%, the weight of intraregional trade
has grown, although at a moderate pace. 
Attention should be paid to the development
of the regional ecosystem, the standards and the
quality culture of the freight forwarding and
logistics industry. Its absence makes planning
and management of cross-regional operations
much more complicated than it should be.
Gilberto Marin Quintero, President and Chief Executive
Officer of Grupo P.I. Mabe, Mexico
“
”
When compared with other regions, the level of
Latin America’s trade integration is put into
perspective. Although still far from the record levels
of economic integration found in the European
Union (around 65% of total EU imports and exports
origin in or are destined to another member
country), Eastern European economies clearly
bypass Latin America’s in intraregional trade. Most
importantly, as illustrated in Figure 11, East Asia and
the Pacific are quickly catching up with Latin
America in this area. Only Africa remains clearly
below Latin America in terms of intraregional
imports as a percentage of total imports.
seemingly outperforming most countries, the
geographic advantage of Latin America is not visible
in the data. Infrastructure investments differ across
sectors. Such commodity-intensive economies as
Chile or Venezuela focus on transport infrastructure,
whereas countries more reliant on manufacturing
industries, like Mexico, concentrate their investments
on energy-related resources.
As mentioned above, Latin America needs to
capitalize to a much larger degree on its
geographical advantage with big importers. The
challenges for the region are well perceived from the
private sector viewpoint. In a recent Investment
Climate survey, over 50% of Latin American
businesses considered infrastructure to be a serious
issue (Fay and Morrison, 2006, in the OECD’s Latin
American Economic Outlook 2008). By contrast, in
East and South Asia, less than 20% and 30%
respectively agreed with this assessment. 
It is so much cheaper to send the product
from China than from Colombia that we serve all
our US West Coast customers only with the
product lines that are carried by our Chinese
suppliers.
Luis Alberto Botero,
CEO of Corona Saniraryware
“
”
Together with efficiency improvements related to
infrastructure, there are also institutional variables
related to the region’s performance on trade
competitiveness. Cargo handling restrictions and
mandatory port services are considerable limitations
to competition at the port level. Export regulations
are predominantly more costly than in other regions
(World Bank, Doing Business Report 2007). At the
opposite extreme, excessive regulation can have
detrimental effects, such as those observed in Brazil
(OECD’s Latin American Economic Outlook). 
Low investment rates and flawed project
implementation are among the main reasons for this
gap in infrastructure competitiveness. Latin
American countries are spending considerably less
on infrastructure than required. While the region
devotes around 2% of GDP per year to that area,
higher investment levels of between 4-6% would be
necessary to catch up with Asia.
In sum, poor and inappropriate infrastructure is a
drawback for Latin America’s economies.
Inadequacies in the port system and railroad
networks hamper export potential. Substantial
progress needs to be made by increasing
investment in these sectors. For Mexico and some
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of a Latin American culture that lacks in innovation:
innovation-oriented human capital and funding have
been scarce and poorly integrated, unlike in other
hubs (e.g., Boston, Bangalore). The level of inter-firm
learning from international best practices is also low.
Most firms have focused on adapting technologies
rather than on creating or improving existent ones.
The motivation to innovate differs across sectors,
with some more keen on improving quality and
others focused on working conditions or
environmental needs. In addition, the large
investments made by foreign multinationals
implanted in the region have not made innovation a
priority.
Nonetheless, some examples show the scope for
further improvement in innovation practices. The
Chilean initiative on natural-resource industries is
one of them. The salmon cluster in Chile is a good
example of the successful implementation of
innovation in a non-traditional sector. Currently
composed of 300 salmon clusters, this sector
employs around 45,000 people. R&D is carried out
in these firms with a view to generating competitive
advantages. A second cluster, the wine industry, is
another example of Chile’s policy on innovation.
Since the late 1970s, this industry has developed
several of its different phases, such as packaging,
transport, the supply of equipment and inputs,
tourism and gastronomy. Although the initiatives in
the wine sector might appear to be isolated, they
have put Chile on par with other main producers of
fine wine. Other sectors would do well to follow this
example.
Deeper regional integration is a win-win strategy for
Latin America’s economies and should be a priority
in their response to China’s growing presence in the
world economy. With the increasing number of
regional trade agreements since the establishment of
the WTO and as capital and labour movement are
liberalized across borders, it is important that Latin
American countries benefit from deeper integration
by increasing their levels of intraregional trade at a
much faster pace than at present. They would also
do well to implement measures to increase the
sophistication of integrated freight services and
transport providers, to set and improve quality
standards, and to harmonize cross-border policies.
The need for innovation: maximizing 
resources9
Since most Latin American economies have
historically been dependent on raw materials and
have regarded technological innovation as a tool for
appropriating commodity rents, developing a proper
culture of innovation in the region seems difficult to
achieve. The two main actors in the innovation
process, business firms and research institutes,
must work closely in order to put into practice a
successful innovation strategy that satisfies their
respective needs.
The Latin American business sector has traditionally
been uncommitted to innovation strategies in the
region, with a low propensity for funding innovation
in most industries. This to a large extent is the result
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9 The analysis in this section is heavily based on the main conclusions in the OECD’s Reviews of Innovation Policy: Chile. 2007. OECD, Paris.
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Source: OECD’s Latin American Economic Outlook, OECD Development Centre, 2008. 
Figure 11.  Intensity in Intraregional Trade by Region (1995-2005) Trade as a % of GDP
Far from this scenario, Latin American universities
and technological institutes should be more active
not only in implementing new technologies, but also
in allowing the current labour force to improve its
skills through retraining programmes and capacity
building in new sectors. Given the rapid pace of
technological change in some countries, it is crucial
to provide a proper learning structure where both
low and high skilled workers can acquire new
knowledge and put it into practice through the
innovation process. This should be examined
particularly in sectors where unemployment is
relatively high because of regional competition, as is
the case of the maquilas in Mexico.
In sum, the absence of sufficient interaction between
the business and research communities is
remarkable in Latin America. At the same time,
technological institutes and universities have little
incentive to collaborate with other research
institutions, as competition prevails over
collaboration. The negative effects of these
phenomena prevent a much needed culture of
innovation from flourishing. The region needs to
expend much greater effort if it is to effectively meet
the challenges posed by a more competitive global
world economy where quick adaptation and
anticipation are, more than ever, the keys to
success. 
The need for diversification: maximizing
opportunities
Establishing a truly diversified economy is one of
Latin America’s most important challenges. Export
concentration by product in the region has
increased significantly since 2001, the period of
China’s emergence, suggesting that commodity
specialization is affecting countries exporting raw
materials. The so-called Dutch Disease
phenomenon, as already mentioned, is a potential
drawback that could hurt manufacturing, other
exporters and producers in import-competing
sectors. Certain Latin American governments
have been successful in implementing policies to
counteract this trend, including the introduction of
stabilization funds, a counter-cyclical fiscal stance
and prudent debt management. Thanks to these
measures, the regional picture that emerges is
one of overall macroeconomic stability, with
inflation and real effective appreciation well
contained. This is a crucial step on the road to
diversification. 
Diversifying the economy and taking advantage of
export opportunities that may exist in other sectors
require both innovation and a sound business
environment, so Latin American countries remain
attractive destinations for foreign investment. Part of
the problem in the realm of regional specialization
lies in the fact that much of the FDI has gone into
natural-resource extraction. Brazil is one of the
countries that have been successful in implementing
a proper diversification strategy. Despite increasing
trade (and competition) with Asian countries, Brazil is
still highly diversified, as are its marginal exports. The
manufacturing sector, which would be seriously
affected under a Dutch Disease scenario, is
remarkably healthy. Furthermore, none of the largest
growth sectors have seen much more than 20%
export growth, and none of the biggest groups in
export growth are commodities. In fact, exports of
agricultural raw materials, ores and metals have
increased in past years, but so have other, higher
value-added sectors. Brazil has been able to
develop strong manufacturing and industrial bases,
taking advantage of the Asian rise, as reflected by
aircraft manufacturer Embraer’s recent deal with
China.
10 One of the exemplary foundations devoted to this activity in Latin America is Fundación Chile. It is the largest private, non-profit organization for the promotion of innovation
in Chile. Having for mission to transfer state-of-the-art technology, management techniques and human skills to natural-intensive sectors, the foundation has developed an
original model for joint ventures, carrying out R&D and adapting foreign technology.
Fostering technological organizations and the role of
public research to boost innovation is also essential.
These institutions provide the skilled workforce
business needs to bring about a true knowledge
economy based on technology diffusion, from
market-led innovation to basic research.10 Although
a number of institutions are involved in innovation
networks, many Latin American countries base their
research systems on universities; higher education
accounts for 40% of total R&D expenditure in some
cases. However, overall research infrastructure in
Latin America is weak: centres are underfunded,
researchers and academics receive meagre
compensation and postgraduate enrolment is
scarce. 
In the past five years we have been
expanding aggressively around the world. What
has impressed me a lot in the developed markets
we have entered are the type of incentives for
R&D and the support in staff training awarded or
shared by the local government.
Dionisio Garza Medina, Chairman of 
Grupo Alfa and Nemak
“
”
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In summary, Latin American countries need to face
persistent challenges in order to take advantage of
the current circumstances while avoiding excessive
specialization in commodity exports. To do so,
governments play a big role in putting into practice
policies that favour diversification strategies. A
proper innovation strategy is a crucial step towards
diversification. Finally, producers need to look ahead
in the value chain and look to injecting value in their
traditional exports, as has been done by highly
diversified commodity exporters elsewhere, such as
in Norway, Finland and Australia.
Summary and Conclusion
The world power equation is rapidly shifting as a
result of China’s economic rise to a size and
influence similar to that of the United States. As
noted above, this is not a myth, but already a reality.
Latin America’s economies need to adapt to this
new competitive paradigm, and should start by
reviewing some of the prevailing misconceptions
about China’s economic success. It is time to design
proactive rather than reactive policies, since China’s
rise is no longer a surprise or a transitory
phenomenon. Latin American governments need to
boost general competitiveness by lowering country-
cost factors and emphasizing policies that promote
innovation that favour the companies of tomorrow.
Investment in infrastructure that maximizes export
comparative advantages and facilitates deeper and
faster regional trade and business integration should
be a priority, together with funding and support of
education and research institutions assimilating the
needs and demands of the markets. Diversification
is also an important and unavoidable challenge for
the region in the coming years, requiring
macroeconomic policies directed to offset the effects
of specialization by moving up the value chain and
looking towards higher-value products for export.
The new world brings threats and risks, but also
many opportunities. As the examples of successful
companies show, business strategies and public
policies must be bold, ambitious, mutually re-
enforcing and forward-looking. 
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